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pacificeagles

May 5

https://pacificeagles.net/the-guadalcanal-landings/

The Guadalcanal Landings

As the largest invasion fleet assembled so far in the war approached Guadalcanal to begin the landing operations, the first order of business for VAdm Frank J. Fletcher’s Task Force 61 was to clear the immediate area of air opposition, and then to assist with the softening up of the beaches. At 0530 the first wave of 93 aircraft took off to attack the landing areas, including no less than 44 fighters for strafing and air cover. Taking off in the pre-dawn darkness many of the pilots got lost and failed to join up with their formations, so it was a rather disjointed force that made its way to Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

Fighters from Wasp’s VF-71, eleven in all, swept in low towards the seaplane base at Tulagi. A unit of H6K flying boats from the Yokohama Kokutai was caught on the water preparing to take off for dawn searches, and a unit of A6M2-N floatplane Zeros was also unprepared. All the aircraft were quickly flamed by the Americans, seven H6Ks and six Zeros in all. Several supporting boats and shore installations were also burned, removing any chance that the Tulagi unit could interfere with the landings. SBDs from Wasp followed up these attacks by dropping bombs on various shore installations, all without encountering any serious anti-aircraft fire.

At Guadalcanal the Saratoga Air Group took the lead. The Lunga Point airfield was approaching completion, but 12 VF-5 fighters strafed every likely target, including the “pagoda” and several hangars. There was no return fire from anti-aircraft guns, even though several guns were in position around the airfield. There were even two Type 11 radar sets, but these were apparently not operating that morning having failed to provide any warning. 26 SBDs followed up the strafing attack by bombing structures around the airfield. The attack caused Japanese troops and construction crews around the field to flee for the hills, and the airfield was captured without incident two days after the marines came ashore. All bombing missions were halted after midday as the operation was proceeding well – the Guadalcanal landings were unopposed, and the marines on Tulagi had the situation well in hand despite heavy fighting.

Tanambogo after being bombed by Wasp aircraft

Afternoon Air Attacks

At Vunakanau airfield near Rabaul, the 4th Kokutai was preparing for a mission of its own when news of the American landings arrived. The 4th was slated to attack a newly discovered Allied airfield at Rabi, on the eastern tip of New Guinea and 27 G4Ms were bombed up and ready to depart when the new threat became evident. RAdm Sadayoshi Yamada, commander of the 5th Base Air Force, elected to send these bombers to Guadalcanal instead, judging that the new landings were a more significant threat. Keen to strike early, Yamada ordered the 4th to attack with bombs instead of re-arming them with potentially more deadly torpedoes. The Tainan Kokutai was to supply 18 Zeros as escort, even though Guadalcanal was at the extreme limit of the Zero’s range – well over 500 miles from Rabaul. At about 10am, just 90 minutes after news of the American invasion had arrived, the 4th and Tainan Kokutai were on their way to Guadalcanal.

Even though no land-based radar was yet operational at Lunga, the Allied intelligence network provided early warning of the incoming strike. Coastwatcher Paul Mason, stationed near Buin in southern Bougainville, radioed “24 bombers headed yours” to Turner and Fletcher at around midday when he spotted the 4th Ku bombers at high altitude. The message arrived in plenty of time but there were nevertheless difficulties in preparing a defensive effort.

News of the incoming Japanese air attack was no real surprise, but the tactical situation meant that the Americans had to plan the defence carefully. Fletcher’s fighters had to defend two locations, about 60 miles apart – his own carriers and Turner’s landing force. Wildcats had to be kept on station to protect both locations, which were not mutually supporting. This placed an enormous burden on the three fighter squadrons and the Fighter Direction Officers responsible for their deployment. As the FDOs struggled to make sense of the likely attack direction, fighters were dispatched as either “CV CAP” for the carriers or “Screen CAP” (SCAP) for Lunga, with the carriers taking priority. Matters were not helped by the F4F’s short endurance, which meant that the CAPs had to be replaced regularly with fresh, fully fuelled fighters. Consequently, when the Japanese finally arrived over Guadalcanal there were just 8 SCAP F4Fs from Saratoga’s VF-5 on station.

Four of the Wildcats were led by Lt James Southerland. The FDO aboard the cruiser Chicago vectored his flight towards the incoming Japanese who were at the time inside a large cloud bank and out of sight. When the G4Ms burst out of the cloud bank Southerland’s fighters were just a few hundred yards away and he immediately led them into the attack, but the escorting Zeroes were equally alert and two F4Fs were shot down immediately, leaving Southerland to attack alone. He shot down one of the bombers and damaged another, before return fire damaged his fighter requiring him to break off. The second flight of Wildcats also made attacks on the bombers but without apparent success.

The remaining bombers arrived over Turner’s fleet and commenced bombing. Their aim was poor, and the bombs landed between transports and cruisers, but hit nothing – nevertheless the bombardiers claimed a destroyer sunk and transport damaged. Immediately afterwards the American fighters returned and damaged more of the G4Ms forcing a response from the escorts which resulted in two more F4Fs being shot down. The remaining Wildcats, some of them damaged, turned for home. Southerland was ambushed by more Zeros, culminating in a famous dogfight with the renowned Japanese ace PO1c Saburo Sakai who poured fire into Wildcat. Southerland was finally forced to bail out of his battered fighter and make his way towards the American lines. In all 5 of the 8 VF-5 Wildcats were shot down.

Sakai meanwhile followed up by attacking a nearby formation of SBDs. Making a poorly executed stern attack, Sakai was severely injured by the defensive guns of the dive-bombers – a bullet hit his skull and blinded him on one eye. Despite this severe wound, Sakai was able to maintain control of his Zero and set course for home. Battling blood loss and partial blindness, Sakai managed to fly the 550 miles home to Rabaul and land safely. He was evacuated back to Japan to recuperate but would fly again despite the loss of his eye.

Whilst the VF-5 Wildcats were fighting for their lives, 10 more F4Fs from VF-6 and eight from VF-71 attempted to intervene. Four VF-6 fighters under Lt Vincent de Poix were first to arrive as the bombers were beginning their withdrawal towards Santa Isabel Island. They made one firing pass on the formation of G4Ms before the escort was able to react, but soon the Zeros shot down one of the F4Fs and forced the others to scatter. The remaining six VF-6 fighters under Lt(jg) Gordon Firebaugh caught up with the bombers almost at the extreme range of their F4Fs. The Tainan fighters, now about 16 in number, again put up an excellent defence of the bombers, quickly shooting one Wildcat down. Firebaugh claimed two of the Zeroes whilst his charges finished off two more bombers, but Firebaugh was himself forced to bail out of his badly damaged fighter. The VF-71 fighters did not arrive in time to fight the Japanese.

In the defence of the invasion fleet half of the American fighters that were engaged were lost, 9 Wildcats in total. They managed to shoot down four bombers and two Zeroes, with two more G4Ms written off due to battle damage.

The Japanese launched one more attack on the 7th by nine D3A dive bombers. These aircraft lacked the fuel to fly from Rabaul to Guadalcanal and return, so it was planned that they would ditch near Shortland harbour on the return leg. These dive bombers only carried small 60kg bombs so it was doubtful they could do much damage to enemy warships. They arrived near Lunga almost an hour after the G4Ms left and attacked without escort. They scored a hit on the destroyer Mugford that killed 21 men. Five of the D3As were shot down by fighters and American AA fire, and the remaining four ditched at Shortland as planned.

To cap off a busy day of air operations, the US Fifth Air Force got into the action when it launched a raid by heavy bombers on Vunakanau airfield. 13 B-17s from the 19th Bomb Group took off from Port Moresby as the 4th Kokutai was busy attacking Guadalcanal, and they reported bombing the airfield despite strong fighter opposition from the 2nd Kokutai’s Zero 32s which caused the loss of one Fortress. No Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground by Gen George C. Kenney, commander of the Fifth, claimed based on faulty intelligence that his bombers had destroyed 75 planes “parked wingtip to wingtip” at Vunakunau.

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D Plus One

The following day RAdm Yamada was determined to find the enemy carriers and attack them. Five reconnaissance aircraft were launched followed an hour later by 26 torpedo-armed bombers from the 4th and Misawa Kokutai and 15 Zeros. When the search planes failed to report any American carriers in the vicinity, the strike group set course for Tulagi and the transport fleet. Due to communications foul-ups and fuel worries, there were only three F4Fs on station over Savo Sound although 14 more were hurrying north to join them. Task Force 62 would have to rely primarily on its own anti-aircraft guns to repel the attack.

Japanese bombers skimming at low level as they attack Allied shipping off Guadalcanal

The Japanese bombers had flown at low altitude north of the Solomons to shield themselves from American radar. As a result, they were first sighted visually just before midday by lookouts. AA guns quickly swung into action and opened up as the G4Ms descended to low level to begin their torpedo attack, whilst TF62 turned away. Almost immediately bombers began to crash in flames as the American gunners found their targets, some of the wrecks barely missing ships as they splashed. One G4M smashed into the transport George F. Elliot and started a large fire. She was later beached and, beyond saving, was allowed to burn out. Very few torpedoes appear to have been launched and the only ship that was hit by a ‘fish’ was the destroyer Jarvis. She was struck forward near her bow and immediately started to take on water.

The three F4Fs on patrol responded to radio calls for help and dived from high altitude down to the deck. There they came across several bombers making their escape at low level, and quickly shot down four of them as well as one of the escorting Zeros, which was itself distracted by a cruiser based SOC in the area.

The attack was disastrous for the 4th and Misawa Kokutai. Seventeen Type 1 bombers were destroyed in the attack, and another crashed after having aborted early. In return they had managed to damage a transport and a destroyer but had otherwise nothing to show for their efforts despite hysterical claims of dozens of cruisers and transports sunk or damaged. It was the worst single day loss of Japanese bombers during the entire Guadalcanal campaign and highlighted the extreme vulnerability of the G4M to American firepower.

George F. Elliot burns after being hit by a crashing Japanese bomber. Two other plumes are destroyed aircraft burning on the water.

Following the successful defence of TF62, Fletcher reviewed his aircraft situation. During two days of operations his carriers had lost 21 fighters to enemy action and operational accidents, more than 20% of his total strength. Aware that Rabaul-based aircraft posed a serious threat to his carriers and that Japanese submarines were likely hunting for TF61, Fletcher determined that it was too dangerous to remain in the area and requested permission from Ghormley to withdraw early. At the time of making his request he believed that TF62 would shortly make its own withdrawal, but the Japanese attacks had disrupted unloading operations and Turner had elected to keep his ships in the area longer to give the marines more time to unload their supplies and equipment. Overnight Fletcher had TF61 sail southeast, away from Guadalcanal, but still within range to support Turner should the need arise. The Japanese had other plans. Their 8th Fleet, a powerful force of heavy cruisers under the command of VAdm Gunichi Mikawa, was rapidly concentrated at Rabaul and made ready to sail for Guadalcanal. The stage was set for the US Navy’s worst ever disaster.

#guadalcanal#invasion#History#South Pacific

pacificeagles

Apr 28

https://pacificeagles.net/the-guadalcanal-campaign/

The Guadalcanal Campaign

Kido Butai’s defeat at the Battle of Midway meant that American positions in the Central Pacific, including Hawaii, were now secure. US Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Ernest J. King now felt that the time was right to begin a counter-offensive, to take full advantage of the changing circ*mstances. He had long thought that the South Pacific was the key to blunting the Japanese offensive – if sufficient forces could be deployed to secure the lines of communication between the United States and Australia, then the area offered the perfect springboard for offensive operations against the key Japanese strongholds of Rabaul and New Guinea. This plan also had the advantage of keeping Allied forces in the Pacific active and engaged with the Japanese, rather than having them hold defensive positions until American industrial output allowed for a Central Pacific offensive to begin sometime in 1943.

On June 24th King cabled Admiral Chester Nimitz to warn him operations were due to begin far sooner than anyone had previously thought possible – Nimitz was informed that he should begin planning for an offensive into the Solomon Islands, targeting Tulagi and “adjacent areas” with a start date of August 1st. That left just five weeks to prepare for what would be the first Allied offensive of the war, into an area that was badly lacking in adequate harbours and airfields. To work out the finer details Nimitz flew to San Francisco for a conference with King, but the XPBS-1 flying boat carrying the admiral crashed on landing and he was lucky to escape with his life.

Wreckage of Admiral Nimitz’s XPBS

Nimitz had already carved out part of his vast command territory, the South Pacific, and appointed V.Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, as Commander, South Pacific (COMSOPAC). He would have overall command of the operation, but he had only taken command of the theatre in May 1942. Now he found himself with just five weeks to prepare his meagre forces. The only major ground forces available to Ghormley were M.Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Division, but this unit was very green – most of the division was still on its way to New Zealand having left the US several weeks earlier. Several smaller units, including the Marine Raiders, the 1st Parachute Battalion, and the 3rd Defense Battalion with 90mm anti-aircraft guns, coastal defence guns and radar were attached the 1st Marine Division when the scope of their mission was expanded in mid-July.

More pressing was the lack of forward bases in the area. The major US forward base at Noumea had sufficient port facilities and a spacious airfield at Tontouta, but it lay almost 1,000 miles from Tulagi and could not offer adequate support to the marines. A fighter strip was under construction at Efate in the southern New Hebrides, itself 850 miles from the target area. Engineers raced to build another field at Turtle Bay on Espiritu Santo in the northern New Hebrides, which at 650 miles distant proved barely adequate as a base for B-17s and PBYs.

Land-based air support for the operation was under the command of RAdm John S. McCain. Elements of several Catalina squadrons from Patrol Wing 1 would provide reconnaissance, supported by the Flying Fortresses of the 11th Bomb Group. Tenders moved to Ndeni in the Santa Cruz islands to support the flying boats. For more direct support, the new Marine Air Group 23 was alerted for deployment to the Solomons once suitable airfields were captured. MAG-23 was only formed on 1st May and had just a handful of veteran pilots, the rest being rookies. VMF-223 and VMSB-232 formed the first echelon which boarded the escort carrier Long Island. VMF-224 and VMSB-242 were to follow when transportation was available. The Army’s 67th Pursuit Squadron was also based at Noumea, ready to move forward in support.

Heavy support for the landings would come in the form of VAdm Frank J. Fletcher’s Task Force 61, built around the carriers Enterprise, Saratoga and Wasp. Enterprise was by now a fixture of the Pacific War, having fought from the first day. Saratoga was returning to action following six months out due to torpedo damage. Wasp arrived in the South Pacific direct from the Panama Canal after an eventful period operating in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, where she twice delivered RAF Spitfires to the embattled island of Malta. All three carriers had an increased fighter compliment, with the standard VF squadron allotment of F4F Wildcats increased from 27 to 36 (although the smaller Wasp had just 30).

One invaluable service available to the invaders was Section C, Allied Intelligence Bureau, better known as the “Coastwatchers”. This was an organisation of mainly Australian and British civilians who lived in the Solomons and surrounding areas before the war, typically managing plantations or acting as colonial administrators. Many remained behind when the Japanese took over the islands, hiding in remote parts of the jungle and relying on the support of the native Solomon Islanders to remain hidden. Equipped with radios and commissioned into the naval services, the coastwatchers provided information about Japanese movements and sheltered Allied airmen who had to bail out over remote areas, amongst other roles. Key to the upcoming offensive would be Jack Read, based near Buka island off Bougainville, Paul Mason on southern Bougainville, and Martin Clemens on Guadalcanal.

Japanese opposition

Meanwhile, intelligence received from British coastwatchers in the Solomons revealed that in early July the Japanese had cleared several coconut plantations on the northern coast of Guadalcanal, across Savo Sound from Tulagi, and were beginning construction of an airfield. Heavy construction equipment was shipped in, and it became clear that the airfield would be complete by early August. The plan for Operation Watchtower was altered and the “adjacent positions” in King’s original operation order were explicitly defined as Guadalcanal and the Lunga Point airfield. The Japanese had only 4,000 troops on Guadalcanal, most of them engineers and Korean labourers. Across Savo Sound on Tulagi were another 1,500 troops including several Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) troops.

Aerial view of Lunga Point airfield under construction, July 1942

The principal Japanese air units in the region were based at Rabaul, well over 500 miles distant from Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The 5th Air Attack Force, administratively the 25th Air Flotilla, had several units of veteran fliers. The crack Tainan Kokutai had many veteran fighter pilots and was primarily equipped with Zero fighters. The 4th Kokutai, which had been badly handled by Lexington’s fighters on February 20, 1942, was equipped with G4M bombers. The 2nd Kokutai was another fighter unit, but they were equipped with shorter range Model 32 Zeros (later known as “Hamp”) that could not make the flight down to Guadalcanal and return. There were also elements of the Yokosuka and 14th Kokutai with H6K and H8K flying boats, some of which were based at Tulagi, as well as small units of floatplane Zero fighters. The major bases were Lakunai on the shores of Rabaul’s Simpson Harbour for the fighters, and Vunakanau further inland for the bombers. A small number of primitive emergency fields existed in the Solomons, primarily at Buka on the northern end of Bougainville and Kieta on the same island’s eastern coastline. No Imperial Japanese Army Air Force units were deployed in western New Guinea.

Final preparations

With only old, inaccurate charts of the target area available, Vandegrift had two of his intelligence offers carry out an aerial reconnaissance to fill in the gaps. Marines Col Merrill B. Twining and Maj William McKean flew to New Guinea and managed to procure an AAF B-17 for the effort. On July 17, 1942, they set out to look at “Ringbolt” (Tulagi) and “Cactus” (Guadalcanal). Tulagi was eventually found no less than 40 miles from where charts thought it was, but it appeared that the reef surrounding the island would be impenetrable to small landing craft and therefore amphibious tractors would be needed. Several floatplane Zeros were spotted trying to get airborne to catch the B-17, so it turned south for a look at Guadalcanal. Here it was revealed that there were no fortifications on the Guadalcanal coast and the beaches were clear of natural or manmade obstacles. The now-airborne Zeros got close enough to fire off a few bursts, with fire returned by the B-17’s gunners, before the Americans broke off and headed for Port Moresby.

Hand-drawn map of Lunga Point and the Japanese airfield, July 1942

Despite the frantic pace of preparations, it was clear that the original deadline of August 1st was impossible to meet. Instead Ghormley deferred D-Day until August 7th. The marines sailed from Wellington on July 22nd aboard transports commanded by RAdm Richmond K. Turner, King’s handpicked choice to lead the amphibious force. On the 26th, the amphibious squadron made rendezvous with Fletcher’s carriers south of Fiji and prepared for a practice landing on Koro the following day. During the dress rehearsal a bombardment of the landing beach was carried out by cruisers and bombing attacks were conducted by carrier planes, but the landing craft could not pass over coral heads and the practice landings themselves were cancelled. Vandegrift deemed the exercise a “complete bust”.

Following this failure, Admiral Fletcher convened a planning conference aboard his flagship, Saratoga. Admiral Ghormley was not present, because he had decided to remain at his HQ in Noumea. Fletcher, Turner, Vandegrift and their senior staff officers discussed the upcoming operation at length but disagreed over key details. There was acrimony over the amount of time TF-61 would remain in the area to provide air support as the marines got themselves established ashore. Turner estimated that it would take 4 or 5 days to fully unload the transports and wanted a full 5 days of cover, but Fletcher, worried about exposing his precious carriers to air and submarine attacks that were sure to come, was prepared to offer only 2 days – although he later increased this to 3. After that there would be no air support until MAG-23 could be flown in when the Lunga Point airfield was completed by marine engineers. With Ghormley unavailable to referee the dispute Fletcher got his way over the opposition of Turner and Vandegrift. With that, the commanders headed back to make their final preparations.

The Task Force now numbered 82 ships, the largest naval formation assembled up to that point in the Pacific War. Departing Fiji on the 28th, the force set a south easterly course in order to approach Guadalcanal and Tulagi from the south. Bombing attacks on Guadalcanal and Tulagi were carried out by the 11th Bomb Group – 9 B-17s struck on 31st July, flying from Efate to bomb the airfield at Lunga and disrupt construction works. A smaller raid the following day destroyed a pair of floatplane fighters, but an attack on the 4th was more difficult for the Americans. Three B-17s were intercepted by Zero floatplanes, one of which was damaged by the Flying Fortress’ gunners. The stricken fighter smashed into a B-17 and both aircraft went down. The next day another B-17 was lost in an attack on Tulagi.

On August 5th the ships turned north to begin the final run in, and Fletcher’s carriers broke off to take their supporting positions whilst the transports continued west of Guadalcanal before turning east into Savo Sound. There were no contacts with enemy ships, and radar screens remained blessedly clear of patrolling aircraft. As dawn broke on the 7th, D-Day, it was clear that the Americans had achieved complete surprise.

#campaign#guadalcanal#marines#History#South Pacific

pacificeagles

Dec 27, 2023

https://pacificeagles.net/boeing-xb-15/

Boeing XB-15

By the mid-1930s the US Army Air Corps (USAAC) saw the need for a new type of long-range bomber. The procurement of the Boeing B-9 and the Martin B-10 and B-12 series had filled an immediate need for medium bombers but advances in aviation technology suggested that a much larger machine capable of inter-continental flight might be feasible. In the early 1930s it was discovered that larger aircraft offered aerodynamic advantages, which coupled with other improvements such as retractable landing gear, controllable pitch and constant speed propellers, and the standardisation on monoplanes meant that a very large bomber could conceivably be constructed. As such, the USAAC initiated “Project A”, approaching both Boeing and Martin to design new aircraft.

On April 14, 1934 the USAAC issued a design request for a new bomber with a combat range of 5,000-miles carrying a 2,000lb bomb load. Boeing produced the Model 294, a large four-engine design which was subsequently designated XBLR-1. Douglas produced their Model 145 which was later designated XB-16. The Boeing design was considered superior and a contract was issued on June 29, 1935 for a single XBLR-1. In July 1936, the “BLR” line was eliminated and the aircraft was redesignated XB-15.

Design

The XB-15 was the largest and heaviest American aircraft ever built when it first flew in 1937. The most striking feature was the huge, broad wings which stretched out to give the aircraft a wingspan of 149ft. The wings were fitted with air brakes and de-icing boots, both recent innovations. The thickness of the wing allowed for crawlspaces that an engineer could use to reach the engine nacelles and carry out minor repairs whilst in flight. The same wing design would later be used on the Model 314 flying boat which carried passengers across the Pacific for Pan American Airways.

A large aircraft requires powerful engines and the XB-15 was originally designed with Allison’s experimental V-3420 in mind. This engine mated two V-1710s together to provide up to 2,600hp for takeoff. Allison struggled to make the huge engine work and they were not considered reliable enough for the XB-15 program. With the risk of project failure due to engine issues considered too high, the designers substituted instead the Pratt & Whitney R-1830-11, rated at just 850hp. Projected performance was naturally greatly reduced as a result.

The fuselage was mostly conventional with several turrets housing six defensive machine guns. There were several innovations for crew comfort – with combat missions expected to last up to 24 hours, living and sleeping quarters for the crew were provided aft of the bomb bay, and heating and ventilation was provided for the crew to keep them comfortable. An automatic pilot was included to ease the burden on the two pilots, and an improved SCR-186 radio compass was installed for the navigator. The XB-15 was the first aircraft to have two auxiliary engines for powering the onboard electrical systems, although these were notoriously unreliable.

Several other innovations were pondered but ultimately rejected for the design. Turbo-superchargers for the engines were considered as they might have resulted in increased power, but were rejected on the basis that too many problems around aerodynamics and propellors needed to be resolved for them to be worth it. Likewise tricycle landing gear was rejected in favour of double-trucked conventional main gear.

Construction took place in Boeing’s Seattle plant. The first flight of the XB-15 took place on 15 October 1937, more than 2 years after smaller and higher-priority XB-17 – this despite the fact that the XB-15 was ordered first. Boeing’s chief test pilot Edmund T. “Eddie” Allen was at the controls alongside USAAC Maj John D. Korkille. The aircraft performed adequately but the top speed was disappointing at less than 200mph. When carrying 2,500lb of bombs the top speed was reduced further to 145mph, which would have made it an easy target for modern fighters. It was clear that the design of the XB-15 was fundamentally flawed and as a result any further production of the type was abandoned.

The Army saw enough potential in the XB-15 to request a modernised version in June 1938, with the ungainly designation Y1B-20. This version was to have featured more powerful Pratt & Whitney R-2180 Twin Hornet engines, offering 1,400hp and a top speed that was anticipated to reach 240mph. The tricycle gear that was proposed for the XB-15 also would have featured. The Y1B-20 would have been slightly larger and heavier than the XB-15, with additional defensive armament. However with the XB-19 already on order and limited funds available for new bombers, there seemed little need for the Y1B-20 so the contracts were cancelled before any were built.

The XB-15 marked something of a dead-end for large bomber development. For an aircraft to meet the USAAC’s requirements it needed much more power which could not be provided by the engines of the day. Research indicated the need to greatly reduce drag, which in turn pointed to a thinner wing with a much higher wing-loading and a fuselage that was as aerodynamically clean as possible. Boeing would learn these lessons and apply them in a series of designs which culminated in the Model 345, which became the B-29 Superfortress.

Service

The sole XB-15 was accepted by the USAAC and delivered to Wright Field in December 1937. It was assigned to the 2nd Bomb Group for extended performance trials and was tested throughout 1938. When in January 1939 an earthquake struck Chillán, Chile, the XB-15 was sent on a humanitarian mission to ferry supplies for the Red Cross to the disaster area. The flight was commanded by Maj Caleb V. Haynes. The XB-15 flew from Langley Field via the Panama canal zone and Lima, Peru to the Chilean capital, Santiago. Haynes was later awarded the DFC for the mission and the crew was awarded the Mackay Trophy for carrying out the outstanding USAAC effort of the year.

A more sombre duty followed for the XB-15 in June 1939, when it was used to carry the body of famed Mexican aviator Francisco Sarabia home to Mexico City. Sarabia had just set a record for flying from Mexico City to New York in time for the 1939 World’s Fair. Sarabia visited Washington on his return trip, and it was here that disaster struck. Taking off from Bolling Field, Sarabia’s aircraft suffered engine failure and crashed into the Potomac River. Sarabia subsequently drowned and the XB-15 was drafted in to carry him to his final resting place. The XB-15 also later made an appearance at the World’s Fair, as a demonstration of American aeronautical engineering prowess.

The XB-15 was also used to set a number of world records for lift capacity and endurance. On July 30, 1939 the aircraft set its first record by lifting a cargo of 14,135kg (31,162lb) to over 2,000m (6,562ft) with pilot Haynes again at the controls (link). A few days later another record was set by the XB-15 when it carried a 2,000kg (4,409lb) payload over a closed 5,000km (3,107-mile) circuit, with an average speed of 267kmh (166mph) (link). Both were ratified as official Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) records that stood until they were broken in 1946 by a USAAF Boeing B-29 Superfortress.

In 1940 the XB-15 moved to Albrook Field near the Panama Canal. It was used in bombing tests against simulated canal facilities, demonstrating some of their weaknesses against bombing attacks. Capt Curtis LeMay, future commander of B-29 forces in the Pacific, was the navigator. A month later the XB-15 surveyed potential airfield locations in the Galapagos Islands, following which construction began on Baltra and Seymour Island airfields which were used extensively during the war years. Following these exploits the XB-15 returned to the US where its defensive armament was removed and additional seating added so that the aircraft could serve a transport for lend-lease crews returning from Europe.

When the war broke out the XB-15 was pressed into service as a troop transport. Eventually it was adapted for permanent non-combat operations, with all of the defensive armament removed and the bomb-bay reconfigured for carrying cargo with a hoist and cargo doors. The modified aircraft was redesignated XC-105, and thanks to its history as the first true American heavy bomber its crew dubbed it “Grandpappy”. Based again at Albrook Field on the Pacific side of the Panama Canal, the XC-105 regularly flew between Miami and bases across the Caribbean, as far afield as the Galapagos Islands, delivering over half-a-million pounds of cargo during its career.

By 1945 the reliability of the XB-15 was becoming a serious problem. The aircraft suffered two in-air fires and a complete loss of electrical power due to a failure of the auxiliary generators. Realising that the aircraft was beyond the point of economical repair, the decision was made to scrap the aircraft. In June the XB-15 was stripped of parts and broken up at Albrook Field, and its remains were later buried.

#Boeing#bomber#Aircraft#Allied Aircraft#USAAF

pacificeagles

Dec 8, 2023

https://pacificeagles.net/boeing-xb-15/

Boeing XB-15

Design

Service

#Boeing#bomber#Aircraft#Allied Aircraft#USAAF

pacificeagles

Jan 1, 2023

https://pacificeagles.net/11-go-air-search-radar/

11-Go Air Search Radar

A Japanese scientific delegation under Cdr Yoji Ito was sent to Germany in February 1941. Although the professional relationship between the Japanese and the Germans was far less cordial than that of the Americans and British, the Germans showed enough evidence of the development of radar for Ito to be shocked. The capabilities of both of their erstwhile ally and the British were evident to Ito and his team and were amply demonstrated by two radar-assisted victories enjoyed by the British in the spring of 1941 – the Battle of Cape Matapan, during which Royal Navy ships sank three cruisers and two destroyers in a night action, and the destruction of the Bismarck which was shadowed by radar-equipped cruisers. Fearing that their advantage in night-combat skills would disappear in the face of Allied technological superiority, the Japanese Navy began a program to produce their own radar designs to close the gap.

Technical assistance for the design of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s first radar was provided by national broadcaster NHK’s Technical Research Lab and the electronics firm NEC. A prototype set operating on 4.2m wavelength was built relatively quickly, followed by a 3m wavelength set in September 1941. In tests this prototype detected a medium bomber at 97km and a flight of three at 145km, performance that was comparable with early-model Allied air-search radar. Three firms were contracted to make components for the production models, designated Mark 1 (for land-based) Model 1 or 11-Go – these are often misnamed as Type 11 in English sources. These entered service remarkably quickly – the first was installed at Katsuura Lighthouse in November 1941.

A handful of 11-Go were produced during the first months of 1942, with the first overseas unit deployed to Rabaul in March. Another pair were deployed to Guadalcanal when the new airfield there was constructed. These were captured by the US Marines when they landed on the island in August 1942, and in the absence of their own radar marines of the 3rd Defense Battalion attempted to put one of the 11-Go into service without much success. One was later shipped to the Naval Research Laboratory where it underwent significant testing. Later still it was used to help train American aviators in the new field of “electronic warfare” helping them to recognise the distinctive nature of Japanese radar sets on their detection and warning gear.

Other 11-Go were deployed to Japanese-held island throughout 1942. Two were sent to Kiska in the Aleutians, where American ‘ferret’ aircraft detected their emissions. Others were deployed to Wake Island to help fend off the infrequent attacks launched by long-range bombers operating from Midway, as well as the Japanese Mandates (the Caroline and Marshall Islands) and the Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima. Dozens were deployed in China and Japan, where they were frequently detected by B-29 crews on their receiving gear. In total around 30 11-Go sets were produced in several variants.

#air-search#radar#Electronics#Technical

pacificeagles

Jan 1, 2023

https://pacificeagles.net/11-go-air-search-radar/

11-Go Air Search Radar

#air-search#radar#Electronics#Technical

pacificeagles

Jan 1, 2023

https://pacificeagles.net/11-go-air-search-radar/

11-Go Air Search Radar

#air-search#radar#Electronics#Technical

pacificeagles

Nov 20, 2022

https://pacificeagles.net/consolidated-pb2y-coronado/

Consolidated PB2Y Coronado

With the first versions of the PBY Catalina beginning to be supplied to the Navy in 1935, attention turned to potential successor machines with better performance. Both Sikorsky and Consolidated were solicited for proposals, and although the Sikorsky model was ready first it was the PB2Y which would win the production contract. The prototype XPB2Y-1 was ready for its first flight by December 1937, and despite several issues was preferred to Sikorsky’s XPBS-1.

The PB2Y shared some innovations from the XP3Y/PBY, most notably the retractable floats, but was otherwise a completely new design. It was a very large aircraft, equipped with four R-1830 engines – unusually on later models these were fitted with 4-bladed propellers inboard, and 3-bladed outboard. The PB2Y originally had a single large tail, but there were problems with directional instability so additional stabilizers were added in an attempt to remedy the problem. This failed to solve the problem and instead a completely new twin tail was designed. Bomb bays were located in the wing roots with fittings for bombs, torpedoes or mines.

The first production machines entered service in late 1940. In squadron service the PB2Y was found to be underpowered, particularly the definitive PB2Y-3 version which had self-sealing fuel tanks and crew armour which added considerable weight. As a result the Coronados were primarily used as transports instead of combat aircraft. VP-13, the original PB2Y operator, established a series of services across the Pacific including a route from Hawaii to Rose Bay, Sydney, Australia – a 4,000 mile one way trip. Additional routes were added to other bases across the South Pacific and beyond as the Central Pacific offensive opened in late 1943. Some PB2Ys were converted into hospital aircraft and employed ferrying wounded servicemen back to Hawaii from forward garrisons, particularly Tarawa.

The PB2Y’s brief career as a combat aircraft began in January 1944, when VP-13 and VP-102 were assigned to strike Wake Island in support of the Marshall Islands campaign. 14 PB2Ys staged from Midway and carried out four raids between January 30 and February 9. 50 tons of bombs were dropped on Wake, but no PB2Ys were lost during any of the 2,100 mile missions. The missions were considered so important that the commanding officer of Fleet Air Wing 2, RAdm John D. Price, flew on two of the raids as an observer. In April 1944 a detachment of radar-equipped PB2Ys from VP-13 flew from Eniwetok, dropping mines in the seas around Truk, but the externally mounted mines badly effected the performance of the aircraft. The same detachment later flew harassment bombing raids on bypassed islands in the Marshalls, as well as anti-submarine patrols. During this time there were occasional contacts with Japanese aircraft, and VP-13 claimed five Japanese bombers shot down.

Thereafter the PB2Y reverted back to non-combat roles. The PB2Y-5R was a dedicated transport version, and it was used by several high-ranking officers including Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The aircraft belonging to Nimitz was one of the first to arrive in Tokyo Bay for the signing of the Japanese surrender in September 1945.

10 PB2Y-3s were provided to the RAF via lend-lease, but they were not popular as patrol aircraft due to their relatively short range. Instead, like the Americans, the British assigned them secondary roles with RAF Transport Command operating them on transatlantic routes.

#Aircraft#Allied Aircraft#RAF#USN

pacificeagles

Nov 13, 2022

https://pacificeagles.net/consolidated-pb2y-coronado/

Consolidated PB2Y Coronado

Consolidated PB2Y Coronado Specifications

PB2Y-3

PB2Y-5

XPB2Y-1

Consolidated PB2Y-3 CoronadoRolePatrol BomberCrew10Powerplant4x Pratt & Whitney R-1830-88 (1,200hp)Speed140mph (cruise)224mph (max)Ceiling20,900ftRange2,310 miles (internal)Armament4x Browning M2 .50cal Machine GunOrdnance12,000lb bombsDimensions79ft 3in (length)115ft 0in (wingspan)27ft 6in (height)Wing Area1780 sq.ft.Weight41,031lb (empty)68,000lb (gross)RadarAN/APS-4 (Airborne surface search)Number produced210

Consolidated PB2Y-5 CoronadoRolePatrol BomberCrew10Powerplant4x Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92 (1,200hp)Speed170mph (cruise)194mph (max)Ceiling20,500ftRange1,070 miles (internal)Armament8x Browning M2 .50cal Machine GunOrdnance12,000lb bombs2 torpedoesDimensions79ft 3in (length)115ft 0in (wingspan)27ft 6in (height)Wing Area1780 sq.ft.Weight40,850lb (empty)66,000lb (max)RadarASC (Airborne surface search)

Consolidated XPB2Y-1 CoronadoRolePatrol BomberCrew10Powerplant4x Pratt & Whitney R-1830-72 (1,050hp)SpeedCeiling0ftRangeArmament2x Browning M2 .50cal Machine Gun3x Browning AN-M2 .30cal Machine GunOrdnanceDimensions0ft 0in (length)0ft 0in (wingspan)0ft 0in (height)Weight49,754lb (gross)Number produced1

#consolidated#flying boat#patrol#Aircraft#Allied Aircraft#RAF#USN

pacificeagles

Aug 21, 2022

https://pacificeagles.net/boeing-307-stratoliner/

Boeing 307 Stratoliner

In 1935 with design work for the B-17 well underway, Boeing decided to create a civilian airliner from the same basic design. Borrowing the wings, engines, landing gear and tail from the B-17 and marrying them to a new cylindrical fuselage designed to be pressurised, the new Model 307 promised much better performance than existing airliners. It could cruise at an altitude of 20,000ft, unlike contemporary planes that had to remain below 15,000ft. With the plane having the ability to fly higher than most weather systems, Boeing gave it the name “Stratoliner”.

Despite the advances promised by the 307, orders were relatively few. The first plane was destroyed when it crashed during a demonstration flight for Dutch airline KLM. Pan Am ordered two Stratoliners and later an additional four, and Trans World Airlines five. The first delivery was to the eccentric tycoon and adventurer Howard Hughes, who bought it for a round-the-world record attempt that was abandoned when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939. Pan Am took delivery of just four 307s before the war put an end to civilian aircraft production but TWA received all five that they ordered. These were named after native American tribes – Apache, Comanche, Navajo, Cherokee and Zuni.

With the outbreak of war in 1941 Pan Am’s 307s remained nominally in civilian service but were under the direction of the Army Air Forces’ Air Transport Command. These were assigned to fly on South American routes for the AAF. The five TWA planes were bought by the AAF and received the military designation C-75 but were flown by their original TWA crews under contract. These were assigned to ATC and initially flew two transatlantic routes: the northern route from Gander to Prestwick, and the southern one from Natal to Accra in the south.

For the first year of the war the C-75s were the only planes capable of nonstop transatlantic flight, although they had the pressurization gear removed and additional fuel tanks installed to make these flights more comfortable. These aircraft regularly flew ‘top brass’ across the Atlantic, including members of the Chiefs of Staff and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s personal aide. A C-75 was also dispatched to China to collect the Doolittle raiders after all of their B-25s were lost.

In 1944 with sufficient numbers of purpose-built military transports available, the C-75s were reconditioned and sold back to TWA. They continued to serve the civilian market for years after the war, although seven were lost to accidents. One 307 serving with the French airline Aigle Azur may have been accidentally shot down by anti-aircraft fire during the Vietnam War in 1965.

Boeing C-75 Stratoliner Specifications

C-75

Boeing C-75 StratolinerRoleTransportCrew5: Pilot, co-pilot, engineer, 2 cabin crewPowerplant4x Pratt & Whitney R-1820-G102A (1,100hp)Speed215mph (cruise)241mph (max)Ceiling23,300ftRange1,750 miles (internal)ArmamentOrdnanceDimensions74ft 4in (length)107ft 0in (wingspan)20ft 10in (height)Wing Area1486 sq.ft.Weight30,000lb (empty)45,000lb (gross)Number produced5

#b-17#Boeing#c-75#stratoliner#Aircraft#Allied Aircraft#USAAF

pacificeagles

Oct 24, 2021

https://pacificeagles.net/the-career-of-the-i-25-part-two/

The Career of the I-25 - Part Two

When I-25 arrived at her berth in Yokosuka harbour, her pilot, Nobuo Fujita, was surprised to receive orders to report to Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo. At first he feared that he was to be disciplined for some forgotten reason, but when the meeting of the Naval General Staff’s First Bureau convened he was surprised to see the familiar figure of Prince Takamatsu, Emperor Hirohito’s younger brother, amongst other luminaries. Takamatsu was himself a distinguished naval officer. As the meeting came to order, Fujita was informed of the reason for his presence – “You are going to bomb the American mainland!”

This order was perhaps not as surprising as it at first seems at first glance. Months before, Fujita had written a proposal for such an undertaking and submitted it to the senior officers of the I-25. The submarine’s executive officer, Lt Tatsuo Tsukoda, had endorsed the plan and it had been eventually percolated its way up the chain of command. And now in July 1942, with the pain and embarrassment of the defeat at Midway uppermost in Japanese minds, the plan was given the go-ahead. Aware that the tiny, slow Yokosuka Type 0 was unsuited for attacks on military bases or well-defended cities, the planners opted instead for an attack on an area of forest in southern Oregon. It was hoped that even a small attack could trigger an enormous forest fire that could consume nearby towns and cities.

The “Lookout” Raids

On August 15 the refuelled and refitted I-25 departed Yokosuka and headed east once more. In addition to Fujita, Okuda and their E14Y, the submarine carried a special cargo of six 76-kg incendiary bombs that were destined to be dropped on American soil. By early September I-25 was off the west coast, where on the 4th she unsuccessfully attacked an unidentified transport ship. On the 7th Fujita was due to begin his attack, but appalling weather put paid to these plans and the I-25 was forced to endure heavy waves for two days, until the weather broke. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, this storm also soaked the target area with unseasonable levels of rain.

Before dawn on September 9, I-25 arrived at the launch position 25 miles off the Oregon coast. Fujita and Okuda climbed aboard their E14Y, which was carrying two of the incendiary bombs, and catapulted off the submarine just after dawn. The tiny plane flew over the town of Brookings, and towards the nearby Mount Emily in the Siskiyou National Forest. In the dense forests beyond, Fujita released first one and then the other of his bombs, before returning back to the coast. Altogether Fujita spent barely 30 minutes in American airspace.

The presence of the Japanese aircraft had been noted by early-rising Forest Service ranger, who noted an engine that sounded like a “Model A Ford backfiring”. The same ranger, Howard Gardner, later reported a plume of smoke near his lookout station. He was ordered to find the source of the smoke and extinguish the fire, being joined by three other rangers. After several hours of hiking the rangers found many small fires around a small crater, clear evidence of a bomb. The fire was quickly extinguished, but the location of the second bomb was never determined. In any event, there was no large conflagration, and no damage caused by Fujita’s attack.

Nevertheless, the bombing caused a degree of consternation on the coast, albeit for less than the December 1941 panic that became known as the ‘Battle of Los Angeles’. The attack made the news on both sides of the Pacific, with the Los Angeles Times declaring “Jap Incendiary Sets Forest Fire” and Asahi Shimbun’s headline triumphantly announcing “Incendiary Bomb Dropped on Oregon State. First Air Raid on Mainland America. Big Shock to Americans”. In response, the Army’s Western Defense Command investigated the attack with the assistance of the FBI. Air patrols were stepped up, and the day after the bombing an A-29 Hudson bomber from McChord Field spotted I-25 on the surface. LtCdr Tagami was able to execute a crash dive, but the bomber nevertheless managed to release several depth charges which caused minor damage to the submarine.

Three weeks after the first attack, on September 29, Fujita tried again. This time the target was an area of forest near Port Orford, a town about 50 miles north of Brookings. This attack achieved even less than the first, with no reports of any fires being started and just a few sightings of the E14Y. Although there were still two incendiary bombs remaining, opportunities to drop them failed to materialise due to poor weather. Instead, I-25 remained in the area for several more days, preying on unescorted shipping. In October 4 she came across the tanker Camden, which had stopped to make repairs to her engines. I-25 dived and fired two torpedoes, one of which hit the tanker and caused her to settle. She soon sank, with a single crewman killed but the remainder rescued. Two days later another tanker was sighted, the Larry Doheny, and torpedoed at short range. A fire quickly broke out forcing the crew to abandon ship, before the Larry Doheny slipped beneath the waves.

Reconnaissance and Supply

Low on torpedoes, LtCdr Tagami set course to return to Japan. On October 11 as she withdrew from the West Coast, I-25’s lookouts spotted two warships on the surface, which were soon identified as two American submarines. Tagami gained a good launch position and fired has last torpedo at the lead vessel. It hit, and soon secondary explosions rocked the I-25. In fact, this submarine was not American but was the Soviet L-16, enroute from Petropavlovsk to northern Europe via San Francisco and the Panama Canal. She sank with all 55 of her crew and an American liaison officer. Her sister ship L-15, following, attempted to attack the I-25 with her deck guns but failed to cause any damage. Two weeks later, I-25 reached Yokosuka and entered overhaul.

When she was ready for sea once more, I-25 was assigned to the submarine flotilla engaged in resupply missions to the beleaguered Japanese garrison on the northern coast of New Guinea. Her E14Y was left behind so that more cargo could be carried in the aircraft hangar. She made four successful voyages, ferrying in supplies and evacuating sick and wounded troops as well as surviving a torpedo attack from the American submarine Grampus. American torpedoes were still extremely unreliable and the single ‘fish’ that struck I-25 was a dud. Soon afterwards she was reassigned to a Truk, where, as 1943 opened, she would resume her career as a combat warship with her floatplane back aboard.

Operating off the Solomon Islands during the Japanese withdrawal from Guadalcanal, I-25 was unable to get into position to attack American warships during the Battle of Rennell Islands, during which the cruiser Chicago was torpedoed and sunk by Mitsubishi G4M bombers. In the aftermath of the Guadalcanal withdrawal I-25 was ordered to perform a reconnaissance of Espiritu Santo, an American air and naval base through which reinforcements for the Solomons flowed. On February 16 she arrived in the vicinity, and launched her floatplane in the late evening for a night reconnaissance. Several months later, in August 1943, I-25 was ordered to repeat her reconnaissance of Espiritu Santo. On August 23 her floatplane again took to the air, this time reporting the presence of three ‘battleships’ as well as smaller vessels.

This report was the last message to be received from the I-25. She was ordered to carry out another reconnaissance flight of Suva, Fiji, in September, but she did not acknowledge the message and was soon presumed lost. Her fate remains unknown but in all likelihood she was sunk by the American destroyer Patterson on August 25. Patterson was escorting a convoy from New Caledonia to the Solomons. As night began to fall she obtained a radar surface contact and moved to investigate. The radar ‘blip’ disappeared but Patterson soon obtained a sonar contact and began a series of depth charge attacks over the following two hours. Following the last of these a large underwater explosion was heard, and the following morning a large oil slick was seen on the surface. Although this was assessed as a damaging attack only, it seems that in fact Patterson’s target was the I-25, and that she was destroyed, sinking with all hands.

#i-25#lookout raids#submarine#Central Pacific#History#South Pacific#South West Pacific

pacificeagles

Oct 17, 2021

https://pacificeagles.net/the-career-of-the-i-25-part-one/

The Career of the I-25 – Part One

Several navies experimented with submarine-launched aircraft, but few embraced the practice as whole-heartedly as the Japanese. Throughout the 1920s several experimental aircraft were developed, and submarines modified with water-tight compartments to carry them, before the Yokosuka E6Y became the first production aircraft to be assigned to the submarine fleet in 1933. Over the next decade Japan launched several dozen submarines equipped with aviation facilities, envisaging that their reconnaissance capabilities would be of great benefit during the anticipated war with the United States. The Japanese lacked bases and large numbers of long-range reconnaissance flying boats with which to reliably detect enemy forces, and it was hoped that using submarine-launched aircraft would allow for the inspection of enemy ports for evidence of activity.

One of these new submarines was the I-25, which would have probably the most noteworthy carrier of any of the aircraft-carrying underwater craft. A Type B1 submarine, she was laid down in February 1939, launched in June 1940, and commissioned on October 15, 1941, just in time for the start of the war. Her first commanding officer was LtCdr Meiji Tagami, an experienced submariner, and she was initially assigned a single Watanabe E9W floatplane to be flown by Chief Petty Officer Nobuo Fujita. She was assigned to Submarine Squadron 1, part of the 6th Fleet, and departed for her first operational patrol on November 21. With the attack on Pearl Harbor scheduled for December 8 (Japan time), I-25 was ordered to patrol north of Hawaii and attack any ships attempting to flee from the area.

Off Hawaii in the wake of the attack which started the war, I-25 was subject to an attack by a patrol plane which strafed and then depth-charged the submarine but caused no damaged. She also participated in a fruitless hunt for an American carrier reported by one of the other submarines in the area, and suffered slight damage due to heavy seas. With the Kido Butai safely withdrawing back to Japan, many of the submarines were released for other duties. Along with I-10 and I-26, also equipped with aviation facilities, I-25 was ordered to patrol the west coast of the United States where she was assigned a patrol area off the mouth of the Columbia River, on the Oregon-Washington border.

On December 18 I-25 spotted a tanker, the St Clair, and launched a torpedo which appeared to set the ship afire. Judging the target to be sinking, LtCdr Tagami elected to leave the tanker to her fate. However, the damage to the St Clair was very slight and she managed to escape. A few days later an intelligence report indicated that three American battleships would soon arrive via the Panama Canal, and so the three submarines were ordered to the California coast in order to intercept them. The report turned out to be false, and so I-25 sailed west to return to vicinity of the Hawaiian islands. On January 8 her lookout spotted what they identified as an aircraft carrier off Johnston Atoll, which was attacked with four torpedoes and claimed as sunk. There is no record of an American ship being damaged in this location and the identity of this target remains a mystery.

A few days later I-25 arrived at the submarine base at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, where she refuelled and reprovisioned. She also received a brand-new aircraft to replace her E9W, the first of the Yokosuka E14Y Type 0 aircraft to reach the fleet. I-25 suffered minor damage during the American attack on Kwajalein on February 1 when she was strafed by SBDs, but she was nevertheless able to set sail in pursuit of the Enterprise – albeit in vain.

Nobuo Fujita and Shoji Okuda pose with their Yokosuka E14Y

Airborne Reconnaissance

Her second war patrol would prove to be even more eventful than her first. I-25 was sent south, with orders to use her floatplane to carry out reconnaissance flights over several ports in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. She departed Kwajalein on February 8 and began the 2,700 mile cruise to Sydney, Australia. Poor weather delayed the first flight of her floatplane for several days, but finally before dawn on February 17 the skies cleared and Fujita’s Type 0 was prepared for flight before being catapulted over the bow of the I-25. The little plane first overflew Botany Bay, to the south of Sydney, before crossing the city itself and investigating shipping in Sydney harbour and its naval base. North of the harbour, Fujita turned back out to see and headed back to I-25. At first the pilot could not find his mothership, but dye markers were released into the sea to mark her position. Having been safely recovered, Fujita reported sighting 23 ships including several major warships.

Next, I-25 moved south to take a peek at the shipping in Melbourne harbour. Fuijta took to the air again on February 26 but in cloudy conditions strayed rather close to the RAAF base at Laverton. Two fighters scrambled to intercept but failed to find the little plane. A nearby anti-aircraft battery also spotted Fujita, but did not get permission to open fire. Having escaped destrucition, Fujita and his radioman, Petty Officer 2nd Class Okuda Shoji, counted 19 merchantmen and several warships before returning to I-25. Four days later, the E14Y was in the air over Hobart, capital of Tasmania, where 5 ships were spotted.

LtCdr Tagami then took I-25 east to reconnoitre the major ports of New Zealand. Bad weather and rough seas prevented the first attempt, but on March 8 Fujita and Okuda flew over Wellington. As I-25 withdrew from the Cook Strait she spotted a steamer but Tagami refrained from attacking, preferring to make a clean escape. Four days later off North Island the submarine was spotted by two patrol craft, but survived the subsequent depth-charging without taking any damage. The following day, March 13, Fujita’s E14Y was once more airborne to overfly Auckland harbour, where he sotted four merchantmen. Whilst he was airborne I-25’s crew spotted another merchantman, and as soon as the floatplane returned Tagami elected to attack it with torpedoes. The target was reported as sunk, but no Allied losses are recorded. Three days later, as the submarine made its way toward Fiji, a cruiser was sighted escorting a merchant ship. As Tagami made preparations to attack, the cruiser changed course forcing the I-25 to dive and lose contact. Fujita took his plane into the air hoping to find the ships, but to no avail.

Arriving off Suva on March 19, Fujita made another pre-dawn reconnaissance flight, reporting a British cruiser in the harbour. The E14Y was spotted and illuminated by searchlight, but Okuda used his signal lamp to flash a Morse message in return and the light was extinguished. Four days later I-25 was off Pago Pago in American Samoa, but the sea was too rough to permit launching her seaplane so instead LtCdr Tagami crept close in to conduct a periscope reconnaissance of the harbour. Nothing of note was detected, and I-25 terminated her patrol and made her way to Truk. After refuelling, the submarine headed back to Japan for a refit, arriving at Yokosuka by April 4. There, she entered drydock. Whilst under repair I-25 escaped unscathed when American bombers on the Doolittle mission damaged the nearby aircraft carrier Ryuho.

The reconnaissance conducted by Fujita and Okuda provided information for the planners of an audacious attack on Australia. As part of preparations for the Battle of Midway, the Japanese planned to launch attacks on widely seperate locations in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans. The western portion of the attack focussed on the recently occupied island of Madagascar whilst the eastern portion selected Sydney on the basis of I-25‘s work. The plan called for midget suubmarines to penetrate the harbour and torpedo Allied warships as they lay at anchor. Two additional aerial overflights were conducted by E14Ys from I-29 on May 21 and I-21 on May 29, before midgets from I-22, I-24 and I-27 began their approach later on the 29th. Only one midget managed to enter Sydney Harbour, where she fired a torpedo at the American cruiser Chicago which missed but sank the nearby depot ship HMASKuttabul. None of the midgets returned to their mother subs.

Repairs completed, I-25 was ready to begin her third war patrol by May 11. She was assigned to the “Northern Force” which was tasked with carrying out Operation AL, the invasion of the American-held Aleutian islands. A week before this operation was due to take place, on May 27, CPO Fujita was again to pilot his E14Y over an Allied port – on this occasion Kodiak, in Alaska. Whilst making preparations to launch her seaplane, I-25 spotted an American cruiser at close range. Unable to cast off the aircraft, and unable to dive with it still mounted on the catapult, LtCdr Tagami was prepared to engage in surface combat with the cruiser until it became evident that the Americans had not seen the submarine in the poor weather. After the cruiser departed, the floatplane was launched, Fujita and Okuda reporting 11 warships and 6 merchants in port.

Thereafter I-25 and her sister I-26 were ordered once more to the west coast of North America. I-25 unsuccessfully attacked a transport with torpedoes on June 5, before managing to hit and damage the British steamship Fort Camosun off Cape Flattery, Washington. The Canadian corvettes HMCS Quesnel and Edmundston picked up her crew, and the ship was towed into Puget Sound for repairs. The Fort Camosun not only survived this attack, but also survived being torpedoed by I-27 in the Gulf of Aden in December 1943.

The Fort Stevens Attack

On June 18 LtCdr Tagami received special instructions from his squadron commander – both I-25 and I-26 were ordered to bombard targets on the coast. I-26 was to attack a radio direction finding station at Hesquiat, on Canadian Vancouver Island, whilst I-25 was ordered to strike a suspected submarine base located at Astoria, Oregon. Both attacks were to take place on June 21.

Soldiers examine shell craters following I-25’s attack on Fort Stevens, Oregon

On that evening, I-25 approached the coast by following fishing boats, thus avoiding potential minefields, and arrived about 8 miles offshore. Unsure of the location of the submarine base (which in actuality had been approved but not yet built) Tagami selected as his target Battery “Russell” at Fort Stevens, located at the mouth of the Columbia River on the Oregon-Washington state border. Fort Stevens dated back to the Civil War and housed a collection of large-calibre coastal defence guns, albeit most of them ancient and obsolete. As midnight approached, I-25 cleared for action and commenced firing. After the first shells arrived a blackout of Fort Stevens was ordered, depriving the gunners of any reference points to aim at. As a result, most of the rounds landed harmlessly in swampy ground, with a few finding the fort’s baseball field. The only meaningful damage occurred when telephone lines were severed, and there were no casualties or injuries to personnel. No fire was returned by the fort’s guns because it was realised that the submarine was out of range of the elderly weapons available. After 15 minutes and just 17 rounds fired, I-25 withdrew out to sea.

The following day a USAAF A-29 Hudson patrol bomber on a training mission spotted the submarine and attacked with bombs, but they fell wide of the mark and Tagami was able to submerge his boat unscathed, before withdrawing further out to sea. I-25 briefly returned to the vicinity of the Aleutian islands, before ending her patrol and setting course for Japan. On July 17 she returned once more to Yokosuka to refit and carry out minor repairs.

#i-25#submarine#Central Pacific#History#South Pacific#South West Pacific

pacificeagles

May 23, 2021

https://pacificeagles.net/nakajima-a6m2-n-type-2-rufe/

Nakajima A6M2-N Type 2 "Rufe"

During the China Incident the Japanese Navy had made extensive use of floatplanes to augment their land-based units. The Japanese faced a lack of suitable airfields around the coastal cities that were conquered between 1937 and 1940, and with little in the way of aerial opposition from the Chinese Air Force tender-based E7K and E8N floatplanes effectively provided local air support to ground units. With a wider Pacific War imminent, and the prospect of combat taking place on under-developed islands, the Naval Air Service realised that a floatplane fighter might offer a way to achieve local air superiority until engineer units could construct true airfields. In September 1940 a project was initiated that would eventually produce the Kawanishi N1K Kyofu, but with the first production models not due to enter service until 1943 a stopgap was clearly needed. In February 1941 the Naval Staff approached Nakajima and asked them to develop a floatplane version of the A6M Reisen (Zero) fighter.

Nakajima chose the latest A6M2 Model 11 as the basis for the new design. Modifications were fairly modest, with the landing gear removed and the wheel wells faired over, and the addition of a large central float and two stabilising wing floats in place of the undercarriage. To maintain manoeuvrability the rudder was enlarged and ventral fin added. These modifications left no room for the Zero’s usual ventral drop tank, so the main float was modified to include an auxiliary fuel tank. Maximum speed was reduced by about 60 knots and climb-rate was likewise affected, but otherwise the A6M2-N performed almost as well as the Reisen. The new fighter was accepted for service and was assigned to front-line units just 6 months after its first flight.

The first Type 2 fighters were assigned to the Yokohama Kokutai at Rabaul, arriving in early June 1942. This small detachment was further dispersed to outlying islands without airfields, most notably to Tulagi where they were to provide cover for construction units on neighbouring Guadalcanal. Several were destroyed on the water during the American landings in August. Later, a detachment operated from nearby Rekata Bay and the float Zeros were often seen tangling with Wildcats over Henderson Field.

A second seaplane fighter unit was attached to the Toko Kokutai, which was operating in the Aleutian Islands. This detachment was deployed to Kiska island, which was in the midst of the “Kiska Blitz” and was facing bombing raids on every day that the weather allowed. The unit first engaged in combat on August 4th, challenging B-24 bombers over Kiska. Thereafter the Type 2s had occasional success against American types including the P-38. Following the recapture of Attu and Kiska, the 452 Kokutai also operated A6M2-Ns from Paramushiro in the Kurile Islands, attempting defend these remote northern islands from yet more American attacks. Type 2s remained in combat almost to the end of the war, with a unit operating as interceptors from Lake Biwa in the Home Islands, attempting to defend Honshu fram B-29 raids.

In 1943 the Allied Air Intelligence Unit assigned the seaplane fighter the codename “Rufe”.

#Nakajima#rufe#seaplane#Aircraft#Axis Aircraft#IJNAF

pacificeagles

Feb 21, 2021

https://pacificeagles.net/the-kiska-blitz/

The Kiska Blitz

For the Japanese, the only bright spot in the disastrous MI-AL Operation was the capture of the tiny Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu – the only pieces of American territory to fall into enemy hands during the war. The two islands had limited military value but would serve as advanced outposts to protect the northern extremes of the Japanese Home Islands, providing warning of any encroachment by American forces. Therefore, it was assumed, the Americans would not be able to launch any further carrier raids on Tokyo or other important locations.

Kiska was home to a small US Navy weather and radio station, manned by a detachment of ten men, and Attu was inhabited by less than 50 natives living in Chicagof village. On Sunday the 7th of June, the Japanese began landing on both Attu and Kiska. Both islands fell to the Japanese in a matter of hours with little struggle, although an American teacher was killed during the occupation of Attu. An American naval task force under RAdm Robert Theobald was unable to interfere due to heavy fog, which also prevented Army and Navy bombers from finding the Japanese naval forces. This was not helped by the choice of patrol sectors, the Americans concentrating on the Bering Sea north of the Aleutians when the Japanese were well to the south. For three days after the initial landings American aircraft criss-crossed the area but failed to sight anything due to the heavy fog – Hirohito’s new secret weapon. All the while the Japanese offloaded more military hardware and supplies, including anti-aircraft batteries which were sited to protect the key anchorages of Kiska and Attu and elements of the Toko Kokutai with H6K flying boats.

Finally, on the 10th of June an AAF LB-30 bomber overflow Kiska harbour, spotted ships anchored offshore, and was fired upon when it approached for a closer look. This news of the occupation of Kiska was confirmed shortly afterwards when a Navy PBY overflew the island and also reported the presence of Japanese warships. The presence of the enemy on American soil galvanised the high command, but with limited ground troops in the area the only option for the present was to launch an air offensive – and so Admiral Nimitz flashed orders to Patrol Wing 4 to ‘bomb the enemy out of Kiska’. PatWing-4, commanded by Capt Leslie Gehres, consisted of four squadrons of PBYs, including the newly-arrived VP-43 with ASE-equipped aircraft. All of the PBYs would be serviced by the tender Gillis, which was moored in Nazan Bay off Adka island.

The Navy would be joined in the offensive on Kiska by the Army Air Forces 36th Bomb Squadron, with B-17s, and the newly arrived 21st BS with B-24s. The weather on the 11th of June was good but mechanical problems affected the B-17s, and so the 21st BS took the lead with five B-24s heading for Kiska from Cold Bay. The effort was led personally by LtCol William O. Eareckson, commanding officer of the 28th Composite Group and the most senior AAF officer in the region. The bombers received a very hot reception from the Japanese who were, by now, well dug-in. The lead ship piloted by Capt Jack Todd took a direct hit in the bomb bay just as the approach began, and exploded, destroying the B-24 and damaging two others in the formation. All the bombs landed harmlessly in Kiska Bay, just as the Navy’s PBYs arrived. The PatWing-4 men dived through cloud to attack from just 1,000ft, scoring a damaging hit on the destroyer Hibiki before making their escape with three crewmen killed. Finally, hours later, the tardy 36th BS B-17s arrived – they came in singly, at the low level of 3,000ft. The Japanese AA guns did not react in time and before long enormous geysers of water erupted around two cruisers and a destroyer as the Americans released their weapons. The five Fortresses escaped and claimed hits to all 3 ships, but recon photos revealed that all had in fact been near-missed – the warships all survived unscathed.

As soon as the PBYs straggled in to Nazan Bay they were refuelled, bombed-up, and sent back to Kiska, in a routine that continued for the next three days. The Catalina had never been designed for this kind of job: it was a slow, ungainly aircraft, and it lacked the structural strength to act as a dive bomber, as it was now called upon to do. Whenever possible the PBYs attacked out of the overcast, limiting the time that the Japanese anti-aircraft crews had to react to their arrival. None of the aircraft had bombsights so the pilots dropped their payloads using ‘seaman’s eye’, which meant that the bombing was generally inaccurate. But the crews nevertheless stuck to their task, repeatedly suffering damage to their PBYs that took the machines out of commission. One Catalina was lost when its parasol wing sheared off pulling out of a dive, but that turned out to be the only aircraft lost during the raids. Many more suffered severe damage and crew losses, but managed to stagger back to Adka.

After three days of bombing the Gillis ran out of bombs and fuel for the PBYs, bringing an end to the Navy’s blitz. The decision was made to evacuate the small village on Adka off which the Gillis had been moored, most of the population leaving with the tender. Additional flights by PBYs brought out the remaining villagers, just hours before three H6Ks from the Toko Ku bombed the settlement having found no military targets remaining. PatWing-4 was also called upon to evacuate the crews of several weather stations and villages on minor outlying islands as it looked like the Japanese would consolidate their hold on the area.

The Army Air Force kept up the effort. LtCol Eareckson again led heavy bombers to Kiska on the 12th, this time taking his charges in at 1,200ft to ensure better bombing results. Hits were claimed on a heavy cruiser. More low-level efforts followed on the next two days, the last of which was opposed by floatplanes which damaged two of the B-17s. After a break imposed by appalling weather, Eareckson again took his heavies back Kiska on the 15th, this time attacking from the relatively high altitude of 14,000ft. On this occasion the bombers were effective, landing several hits on the cargo ship Nissan Maru. Three days later Nissan Maru was hit again, this time sustaining heavy damage. Set afire, the ship soon sank to the bottom of Kiska Harbor. In return a single B-24 was shot down, but the crew was rescued by a Navy PBY.

Nissan Maru burns off Kiska, June 1942

The prevailing weather conditions in the Aleutians proved to be the dominant factor in the summer of 1942. The weather dominated almost all tactical plans, often forcing postponements and cancellations of attacks on the Japanese. Conditions were so bad that on occasion bombers had to estimate their location by spotting the peak of Kiska volcano above the cloud layer, and drop their bombs through the overcast by stopwatch. Naturally, bombing results were abysmal. As the weather closed in there was an obvious drop off in the intensity of the effort. With the Navy PBYs back to searching, and Army bombers struggling to find the targets let alone hit them in the face of fighter opposition, there was little prospect of ‘bombing the enemy out of Kiska’. The realities of trying to fight a war in one of the most hostile climates on Earth were beginning to become apparent. In late June, Admiral Theobald issued orders to stop the blind-bombing, and missions stopped being daily occurrences.

On the 25th of June a PBY on a recon mission to Kiska came under attack by a floatplane. One gunner was killed by machine gun fire but the plane escaped to make its report. This established a pattern that was to continue for the next few months – American bombers attacked Kiska singly or in small groups, and Japanese floatplanes attempted to stop them. Aerial combat occurred occasionally, with the odd aircraft on either side shot down. One such instance took place on the 7th of July, when eight bombers were attacked by a new type of 250mph floatplane fighter. This was one of the first contacts with the A6M2-N, later codenamed ‘Rufe’, which was a variant of the Zero fighter fitted with floats to allow it to operate from seaplane bases. This unit was attached to the Toko Kokutai and would provide protection against the bombing raids on Kiska until a permanent airstrip could be built on the island. The Americans had their own new fighter, the twin-engine, 400mph P-38 Lightning which was introduced to combat by the 54th Fighter Squadron. On the 4th of August, a pair of patrolling P-38s found and shot down two H6K flying boats from the Toko Ku, the first victories for the Lightning.

At the end of August 1942 landings were made by American forces on Adak, an island about halfway between Dutch Harbor and Kiska . A US Army engineer aviation unit arrived and surveyed airfield locations, assessing that a marshy area could be drained and an airfield quickly constructed. This new facility allowed fighters based there to escort bombers all the way to Kiska. Within weeks P-38s and B-24 bombers were based at Adak, with missions continuing through the rest of 1942. However, the North Pacific Theatre was low down on the list for reinforcements, especially given the requirements of the Guadalcanal and North African operations. American forces in the area remained weak and there would be no major offensives until 1943.

#aleutians#kiska#History#North Pacific

pacificeagles

Sep 13, 2020

https://pacificeagles.net/darwin-summer-1942/

Darwin, Summer 1942

As war waged across the Pacific, one relative backwater saw renewed battle as a veteran Japanese air group duelled with a rookie American unit in the skies of northern Australia. Following the devastating raid on Darwin, in the Northern Territory, on February 19th 1942, Allied commanders had realised the extreme vulnerability of that part of the Australian coast. When the Japanese invaded Timor they took possession of Koepang airfield, which was within easy striking range of Darwin and the surrounding area. With Royal Australian Air Force units hard pressed defending New Guinea, the only available unit was an American fighter group, fresh off the boat from the United States. LtCol Paul Wurtsmith’s 49th Pursuit Group was the first complete US Army Air Force to reach Australia, arriving on the 1st of February, but it was manned by very inexperienced pilots who spent their first few weeks in-country training at airfields in the south.

On the 14th of March the first contingent of the Takao Kokutai under LtCdr Goro Katsumi, with 18 G4M bombers on strength, arrived at Koepang on the island of Timor. There they joined Captain Yoshio Kamei’s 3rd Kokutai, which had already been at Koepang for several weeks with their Zeros and a handful of reconnaissance aircraft. Following the surrender of the Netherlands East Indies the Japanese began to turn their attention more fully against Australia, from where potential counterattacks might be launched. The biggest challenge was the distance between Koepang and Darwin, which was over 500 miles, most of it over open ocean – a very long way to fly, especially with battle damage. The length of the missions rivalled those conducted from Taiwan to Manila earlier in the war, and from Rabaul to Guadalcanal later in 1942.

49th PG P-40Es near Darwin

49th Pursuit Group

While the Japanese were settling in at Koepang, the 49th Pursuit Group was getting its first taste of combat. With Port Moresby at risk and no available Australian fighters, a detachment of Lt Robert Morrissey’s 7th Pursuit Squadron was sent to Horn Island, off the northern coast of Australia and 75 miles south of Moresby. 12 P-40s made the trip, but mechanical problems meant that only 9 arrived safely. The airstrip was so remote that there was no easy way to transport ground crews there, and so the pilots were given rudimentary instruction in maintaining their own aircraft. The 7th PS only had to deal with a single attack by eight 4th Kokutai bombers on the 14th of March, during which they claimed several aircraft shot down. However the primitive conditions took their toll and within days the Americans were reduced to just two airworthy P-40s.

In the aftermath of the attacks on Darwin and Broome, the 49th was ordered to move forward to plug the gap in the northern defences. On the 8th of March the 9th PS began a cross-country flight that required several hops from the rear area to Darwin, with the 7th and 8th to follow. The flights over the 2,000-mile route took several weeks, with many extended stops for weather and repairs to the P-40s. it was not until late March that the 9th arrived at Darwin, only to find that the airfield was still too badly damaged to support the squadron. They therefore moved south to Batchelor Field to take up residence there. The three squadrons gained valuable infusion of experience when 12 pilots who had survived the fall of the Indies joined the 49th. Meanwhile, Australian engineers were busy building several additional airfields along the Stuart Highway, which could be used to disperse the 49th or to act as emergency fields.

The Takao Kokutai had been sending small groups of bombers to attack targets around Darwin without escorts throughout most of March, possible because there was no aerial opposition in the area. That began to change on the 22nd when a C5M reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by 9th PS P-40s. This occurred whilst eight G4Ms were busing bombing the town of Katherine, far inland – in fact this was the deepest penetration of Australia by the Japanese during the entire war. The Japanese were slow to learn from this loss, and six days later sent a formation of 7 unescorted bombers to strike Darwin’s airfield once more. By this time an Australian AW radar set based at Dripstone Cliffs was on the air, and this device directed P-40s of the 9th PS to intercept. The attackers were met out at sea before hitting the target, with the Americans claiming 3 bombers shot down, although only was 1 actually lost. From then on the 3rd Kokutai would be called upon to escort the bombers over Darwin.

Clashes between the 49th PG and the 3rd Ku occurred sporadically in late March, as the Japanese probed with small raids by a handful of bombers. On the 4th of April battle was joined in earnest, when seven G4Ms covered by six Zeroes were intercepted by 14 P-40s. Three bombers fell, but so did two P-40s and another was destroyed on landing – the pilot, 2Lt John Livingstone, was killed. The air strip at the 34 Mile marker on the Stuart Highway was subsequently named in his honour. The Japanese losses were soon made good when the other half of the Takao Ku completed operations in the Philippines and arrived at Koepang, boosting the unit to a nominal strength of 36 bombers. Harassing raids by RAAF Hudson bombers had made Koepang a dangerous place to remain, so the Japanese planned to withdraw back to Kendari and use Timor as a staging base only. Meanwhile the Americans also came up to full strength when the 8th and 9th Pursuit Squadrons joined the 7th PS, reuniting the 49th PG.

Darwin Under Siege

The 25th of April saw the largest raid on Darwin since the devastating February strike. 27 G4Ms covered by 15 Zeroes headed for Darwin’s main airfield. The 49th PG was up in force, with no fewer than 50 P-40s rising to intercept. The Japanese were able to release their bombs on the target before the Americans made their attacks, which were devastating. Four bombers were downed and three more badly damaged, one of which ditched into Dili harbour. Two days later the Takao Ku was back with a beefed up escort, 21 Zeroes covering 16 bombers. The 49th again attacked, by the commander of the 8th PS, Captain Allison Strauss, was shot down and killed. This time only a single G4M was lost but the punishment meted out by the Americans forced a temporary pause to the bombing campaign, and the Takao Ku moved to the safety of Kendari. Darwin was given a six-week reprieve.

When the “rikko” returned in mid-June, they used new tactics to minimise losses. The Takao from now on would attack from higher altitude, over 25,000ft, which reduced bombing accuracy but also lessened the risk from the American Warhawks. They would also have a heavy escort, with 45 Zeroes called in to cover the 27 bombers that set out on the 13th of June. Only a few P-40s were able to intercept after bombs had plastered Darwin’s RAAF base, and they were quickly brushed off by the 3rd Ku with two P-40s being lost. Two Zeroes likewise returned to base, but the bombers escaped with only minor damage. Two days later the Japanese returned, albeit with a smaller escort of just 21 fighters. These flew ahead of the bombers and engaged the (newly renamed) 49th Fighter Group, shooting down two. The bombers hit Darwin town, with eleven suffering damage but all made it safely back to Timor. The very next day the Japanese returned, with an effective escort that cost the 49th three Warhawks and required three more to make forced landings.

49th PG pilot on his P-40. Ruins of a hangar at Darwin RAAF field in the background

Thereafter the Japanese changed tactics again, switching to night raids by small numbers of G4Ms. No nightfighters were yet available and the pilots of the 49th lacked the equipment and training to take on the night intruders, so Darwin’s only defence were several anti-aircraft batteries which had little effect. On the 30th of July the Japanese reverted back to daylight attacks, when 26 bombers again headed for Darwin’s airfield. 27 escorting A6Ms duelled with 36 P-40s which had advance warning of the raid thanks to the RAAF radar crews. A P-40 was shot down but the Americans extravagantly claimed nine enemy machines destroyed, although in reality just a single Zero was lost.

The last major clash between the 49th FG and the Takao and 3rd Kokutai took place on the 23rd of August. This time the target was Hughes Field, an RAAF base inland from Darwin, and again the Takao sent up a full-strength formation of 27 bombers. 36 P-40s had time to scramble and reach intercept altitude, where they were met by 27 Zeroes. One G4M was shot down and another forced to head back to base on one engine. The 49th relied on hit-and-run tactics that confused the 3rd Ku pilots and allowed many opportunities for the Americans, who eventually made claims for 15 enemy aircraft against actual Japanese losses of just five.

With that first bombing season against Darwin drew to a close. The raids had caused limited damage to Darwin, but had prevented the Allies from basing significant numbers of ships in the port. The Takao Ku remained at its base at Kendari but did not launch any significant attacks on the Australian mainland for the remainder of the year, instead launching limited night attacks by small groups of bombers. The Guadalcanal campaign was beginning to ramp up and the Japanese moved reinforcements to Rabaul, including elements of the 3rd Kokutai. The Americans likewise began to re-prioritise, and the 49th Fighter Group began to move to Port Moresby in September. The Americans were replaced by the RAAF’s number 76 and 77 Squadrons, which were likewise equipped with P-40s. Opportunities to engage the Japanese were extremely limited until the following spring of 1943, when a renewed offensive was launched.

#1942#darwin#History#South West Pacific

pacificeagles

Aug 16, 2020

https://pacificeagles.net/the-german-raiders-thor-and-michel/

The German Raiders Thor and Michel

After the loss of theKormoranon November 19th, 1941, there were no German auxiliary cruisers still afloat anywhere in the Pacific or Indian oceans.Keen to put pressure on the Royal Navy and force it to defend the sea lanes all over the world, the Kriegsmarine had already decided to send more “hilfskreuzer” to prey on British merchantmen in the far reaches of the world’s oceans.

The Raider Thor

The next raider to been sent on a cruise in Far-Eastern waters was theThor. Known as “Schiff 10” to the Germans and “Raider E” to the British,Thorwas one of the smallest of the raiders with a displacement of justunder3,800 tons.Built as a banana boat for the South American trade, she wasdueto be namedSanta Cruzbefore she was requisitioned by the Kriegsmarine in the spring of 1939 beforecompletion andconverted into a merchant cruiser. The construction of this ship had been subsidised by the Kriegsmarine, which knew that small, fast merchantmen would make ideal auxiliary warships when the time came.Thor was equipped with six 150mm guns, four torpedo tubes and a suite of anti-aircraft guns.In June 1940 she set out on her first cruise in the Atlantic, during which she sank 12 shipsfor a total of almost 100,000ton.Thorhad also survived three different encounters with Royal Navy armed merchant cruisers, sinking one of them, before returning to Germany in April 1941.

Thor underwent a thorough refit atKiel’s naval dockyard. Shewas given new 150mm guns and aSeetaktradar, the first to be fitted to an auxiliary cruiser.She retained asingleArado196 floatplane for reconnaissance,to be flown byFlying Officer Meyer-Ahrens.Thoralso had a new commanding officer,Kapitän-zur-See GüntherGumprich. Hersecond cruise got off to an inauspicious start. DepartingKielunder a blanket of thick fog, the raider rammed the Swedish ore carrierBothniaand sank her.Thor’s bows weredamagedand she had to return to Kiel for repairs.

Setting sail again on November 30th,Thorbenefitted from poor weatherthathelped her slip through the English Channelbefore she reached La Rochelle in France.She remained there for several days before making an abortive attempt to break out into the Atlantic,which wasthwarted byBritish air patrols.Forced to return to port, she finally left France for good on the 17thofJanuary,1942.Turning south,Thorcrossed the equator on February 4thandarrived at her initial patrol area in the South Atlantic by the 25th.

A month latershe came across the Greek-registeredM.A. Embiricos, took off her crew, and sank her with a torpedo.On the 30thof March Thor shadoweda freighter for several hours beforeGumprichsent hisAr196 into action with orders to use a grappling hook to rip her radio antenna away.This being achieved, the target was unable to escape and after a brief shellingwas stopped and boarded. This ship, the BritishWellpark, was then scuttled.Two days later another British freighter, theWillesden, was dispatched in similar fashion, and on April 3rdthe Norwegian freighterAustwas likewise sunk.A third British freighter, theKirkpool, followed on the 10th.

Thor was finally ordered into the Indian Oceanwhen the Michel arrived to take over the South Atlantic beat.She rounded the Cape of Good Hope on April 22nd, evading a Britisharmed merchant cruiser in the process, before meeting the tanker Regensburg to re-provision and transfer prisoners.Consultations with the Japanese Navy had led to a division of responsibility in the Indian Ocean – I-boats were active in the west, where the British were about to initiate landings on Madagascar. To keep clear, Thor was to operate well to the southeast.

On May 10th,1942, Thor’s Ar196 was airborne on patrol when it spotted a large liner. The ship’s crew in turn spotted the plane and prepared for an attack. Six hours later the Arado returned and initiated a strafing run, as well asunsuccessfullyattempting to rip off the ship’s aerials.Thor soon appeared on the scene and shelled the vessel, but not before SOS messages were sent out.Finally, as the raider’s guns began to find their mark, the captain of the ship – the Nankin – stopped and order his passengers and crew to abandon ship.A German prize crew went aboard the liner and repaired the slight damage caused by a sabotage attempt, before both the Nankin and the Regensburg were sent on to Japan.

On the 14thJune of June Thor’s Seetakt radar picked upa targetin the dark. The raider closed in to attack and opened fire in the darkness, quickly finding that range and landing hits on target. Almost immediately a fierce fire began to rage on the victim, which turned out to bethe Dutchtanker Olivia.Only one survivor was picked up, but12 more escaped in a boat. Eight of these survivors died before the remaining four washed up on Madagascar a month later.

Five days later the patrollingAr196 came across another target, and attacked with machine guns and bombs. A warning salvo that followed shortly afterwards from Thor convinced captain of the Norwegian motor-tankerHerborgto stop. She was carrying a valuable cargo of 11,000 tons of oil. A prize crew was sent aboard and took the tanker to Japan.On the 4th of July another Norwegian tanker, the Rossbach,was discovered and again acombination of strafing, bombing and shelling brought her to a halt.She was in ballast, or empty, but taken as aprizenonetheless.

Thor gave chase to another target spotted by her lookouts on the 20thof July. The ship tried to flee from the raider, but also fired backwith her single gun and transmitted an SOS message, necessitatinga running fight which eventually resulted in the target’s gun crew and the radio operator being killed.On fire, the freighter Indus came to a stop and 49 survivors werepicked up.She was to be the Thor’s last victim.The raider cruised unsuccessfully off Western Australia before passing throughSundaStraitand making for Borneo. She briefly stopped there before heading to Japan for refit, arriving in Yokohamaon October 9th 1942.

Whilst moored in Yokohama, disaster struck. On the 30th of November the nearby supply ship Uckermark, herself undergoing refit, underwent a series of explosions and caught fire. The fire quickly spread to Thor, the captured Nankin, and the Japanese ship Unkai Maru. All four ships were soon destroyed by the conflagration with 12 of the Thor’s crew being killed. Gumprich survived and was soon assigned to another raider that would arrive in Japan early in 1943.

The Raider Michel

The final German auxiliary cruiser to reach the Pacific, indeed the last hilfskreuzer to be active anywhere on the world’s oceans, was Schiff 28, known as Raider H to the Allies, and named Michel. This ship was launched in April 1939as the MVBielskoinDanzig, but was seized by Germans after the invasionof Poland and renamedBonn.It was originally planned to fit out the Bonn as a hospital ship, before the decision was made to convert her intoa raider.Main armament for the Michel was taken from the raider Widder, a sister of the Atlantis, which had been decommissioned due to her unreliable engines. Michel had the usual raider armament of six 150mm guns, six torpedo tubes with 24 ‘fish’, and anti-aircraft guns.She was also outfitted with twoAr196s and a light speedboat.

Michel was commissioned on September 7th1941, under the command of Kapitän-zur-See Helmuth Von Ruckteschell.She departed Kiel on 9thMarch 1942, but was attacked by British patrol units during her attempt to break through the Channel.This caused minor damage and the death of oneofficer, butthe raider nevertheless safely arrived at LaPalliceon March 17th.Three days later she departed and broke out into the Atlantic. Michel was to be assigned the South Atlantic area which had been vacated by the Thor, which had moved into the Indian Ocean. In time, Michel was to follow her predecessor east.

Michel had a busy time of it, sinking nine ships in the Atlantic over the next few months. First, on April 19th, was theBritish tankerPatella, whose crew was taken off before the ship was sunk with demolition charges. Three days later the American tankerConnecticut went to the bottom. On the 1st of May, however, one potential victim managed to escape. Heading south passed St Helena, the Michel came across a liner and, with her crew disguised asBritish sailors, order her to stop. Suspicious, the captain of the Menelaus refused and went to maximum speed to escape.The 16-knot Michel could barely keep up and sent the speedboat Esau to intercept, but the liner dodged her torpedoes and eventually escaped – the onlyship ever to escape from a raider after an attack had begun.

Normal service was resumed on the 20thof May, when the Norwegian freighter Kattegat was stopped and scuttled. On the 5th of June Michel found the disabled Liberty ship George Clymer after listening in on her distress signals. Esau hit her with two torpedoes but she remained afloat, eventually being finished off by a British ship. Six days later Michel fired without warning on the freighter Lylepark, which soon caught fire. Survivors were taken off, and the burnt out ship later sank.

Michel found and sank the elderly liner Gloucester Castle on July 15th, before finding two tankers on a parallel course the next day. The Esau was sent after one, the tanker Aramis, whilst Michel herself gave chase after the William F. Humphrey. This ship was hit several times by shells and at least one torpedo fired by the raider. 29 of the crew escaped into boats and were picked up by Michel, which then met up with Esau and finished off the Aramis. Heading south again, Michel met with the raider Stier and the pair briefly hunted together without success, then split up again. At night on the 10th of September, Michel came across and quickly sank the US freighter American Leader. The next evening, Michel found the motor ship Empire Dawn and shelled her to a stop. Despite the crew signalling their surrender, Ruckteschell ordered more fire on the ship which killed several of the crew. After the war, he would be tried for this action and others whilst in command of the raider Widder. He was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, however he died in prison in 1948.

Michel then entered the Indian Ocean, after Ruckteschell had a brief ‘discussion’ with his commander in Germany as to the best hunting ground for his ship. The raider refuelled from the tanker Brake on the 14th of November, and commenced hunting. Two weeks later Michel encountered a feighter in the dead of night, and closed quickly to short range before opening up with a devastating salvo that hit the target’s bridge, defensive guns, and lifeboats whilst also starting fires. Torpedoes from the Esau soon followed and the freighter, the US-flagged Sawolka, sank. 39 survivors were fished out of the ocean.

On the 9th December, a storm had forced the Michel to halt and ride out the swells, but a surprisingly another ship emerged from the gloom and all hands were quickly ordered to their battle stations. This was the Greek freighter Eugenie Livanos, whose crew was busy celebrating St. Stephen’s day. Torpedoes put and end to the party, and more survivors were plucked from the sea. The raider was then ordered back to Germany, to the joy of her crew. She re-entered the Atlantic and on 2nd January her Ar 196 spotted the British freighter Empire March. Michel and Esau together stalked the target, before the cruiser opened fire with guns and torpedoes, and the speedboat added her own fish as well. The freighter quickly went down, with 26 survivors taken aboard Michel. This was the first time on the entire cruise that the pilot, Konrad Hoppe, had found an enemy ship whilst patrolling.

Ruckteschell then received a change to his orders, forbidding him from attempting to break through the Allied blockade and return to Germany. Instead, he was ordered to Japan. By February 7th lookouts spotted the island of Bali, where the Michel briefly docked at Batavia. She then headed for Singapore, where her prisoners were landed. On the 2nd of March, Michel arrived at Kobe in the Japanese Home Islands, 358 days after she had left Germany. Ruckteschell took the opportunity to request his relief, due to ill health, and spent the rest of the war in various Japanese hospitals. He was replaced as commander of the Michel by Kapitän-zur-See Günther Gumprich, who had been unemployed since the destruction of the Thor in November 1942.

After undergoing a thorough refit, on May 1st Michel departed Japan and headed back to the Indian Ocean. By June 14th she was 300 miles west of Australia, where her Ar 196 reported a ship heading west. Michel closed and launched a surprise attack at night in Gumprich’s preferred style. Fires broke out and the crew began abandoning ship. This was the Norwegian freighter Höegh Silverdawn, which was heading for the Persian Gulf. Two days later lookouts spotted a large tanker which was shadowed until nightfall. This was another Norwegian vessel, the Ferncastle. The Michel again closed in to attack. 2 torpedoes from the Esau caused damage but Ferncastle’s captain thought they came from a U-boat. When Michel came into view, the crew realised that escape was impossible and surrendered, although several escaped in the dark in lifeboats. Worried that the escapees might report his location, Gumprich then took the Michel south of Australia into the Pacific. Pickings were slim for the Michel and she crossed the entire ocean without encountering any shipping and was off the coast of Chile by late August. There she narrowly avoided destruction when she spotted the American light cruiser Trenton, but Michel managed to slip away without being spotted.

Heading back west, in the vicinity of Easter Island Michel spotted a tanker, Again, she was shadowed until nightfall and then attacked. Almost at the first salvo the tanker, the Norwegian India, split open and a huge fire engulfed the vessel. There were no survivors. Michel then had a miraculous escape when, in foul weather, she found herself coming across an American convoy with strong escort. Carefully moving away she allowed the distance to open, and slipped into the gloom. With increasing Allied strength and limited opportunities, Gumprich elected to return to Japan.

On October 17th,as the raider was heading for Yokohama, she was spotted by the American submarine Tarpon, which shadowed and attempted to gain attack position. This achieved,a spread of torpedoes was fired, two of which hit the Michel. The ship stopped and began to list, before the Tarpon fired a second salvo of torpedoes which caused Michel to explode. Only 110 of the crew of373 survived,Gumprichnot amongst them.Michel was the last of the raiders, and with her demise the hilfskreuzer were consigned to history.

#german raiders#michel#thor#Burma-India#Central Pacific#History

pacificeagles

Jun 7, 2020

https://pacificeagles.net/the-battle-of-midway-mikumas-nightmare/

The Battle of Midway: Mikuma's Nightmare

When word of the American attack in the Kido Butai, and the subsequent destruction of the Kaga, Akagi and Soryu, made its way back to Admiral Yamamoto aboard his flagship Yamato, he was stunned. Information from captured American aviators also revealed the array of forces that the Japanese were up against for the first time – three carriers operating in two groups. Electing to re-organise his forces, Yamamoto temporarily suspended the invasion of Midway, ordering the attack transports to withdraw to the west, and ordered the two carriers involved in the Aleutians operation to head south with all possible speed to reinforce Nagumo’s Kido Butai. As part of this redeployment the 7th Cruiser Division – Kumano, Suzuya, Mogami and Mikuma, plus destroyers Asashio and Arashio – was ordered to close on Midway and carry out a bombardment. Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita was in charge, his flag flying from the Kumano.

At the time Kurita received his new orders his ships were 400 miles from Midway, necessitating a high-speed run in to the island in order to deliver the bombardment before the inevitable attack by American aircraft. Even so the shelling would have to be delivered in daylight, a highly dangerous undertaking with US Navy carriers in the vicinity. The cruisers went to maximum speed and soon left their escorting destroyers behind. Meanwhile the submarine I-168 was ordered to deliver her own bombardment to keep the island occupied whilst Kurita approached.

In the early hours of the 5th of June, more messages reached Yamamoto – these making clear the hopelessness of the Japanese position. The captain of the Akagi requested permission to scuttle his ship, her situation being completely hopeless. This request seems to have shocked Yamamoto, who soon after ordered the cancellation of the Midway operation and the recall of all forces. However, the message that was intended for Kurita’s 7th Cruiser Division was mistakenly sent to the 8th Cruiser Division, a mistake that was not rectified for several hours. By the time the recall message was received at about 0200 on the 5th, Kurita was just 90 miles from Midway.

Collision at Sea

Just moments after changing course to withdraw to the east, a lookout aboard the Kumano spotted the silhouette of the submarine Tambor. Orders for an emergency turn were flashed to the cruisers astern but the Mikuma, third in line, made a 90-degree turn instead of a 45-degree turn as ordered. Mogami, last in line, turned as ordered but soon the shape of the Mikuma ahead loomed in the darkness ahead, too late for any kind of evasive manoeuvre. Mogami rammed her sister just aft of the bridge, puncturing Mikuma’s oil tanks and causing fuel oil to leak into the sea. Mogami’s bow was badly crushed, almost all the way to her forward turret, which severely curtailed her speed. Kurita assessed the situation and, aware that he had been spotted by the Tambor and that American air strikes could be expected soon after dawn, elected to detach the destroyers Asashio and Arashio to escort the cripples whilst the Kumano and Suzuya escaped at high speed.

The Tambor’s report of ‘many ships’ so close to Midway brought the predictable response – it suggested that the Japanese might still be trying to force a landing. Other American submarines in the area were ordered to close in to protect Midway, and bombers on the island were readied for attacks. To the north, Spruance copied the dispatch and turned his two remaining undamaged carriers south, ready to assist if needed. Twelve B-17s took off from Midway just minutes after the message was received, but they failed to find the twin cripples and returned empty-handed. Soon afterwards a PBY made contact and gave an accurate position report but identified the vessels as ‘two battleships’ – a mistake which was to cause considerable confusion for the next two days.

A burning Mikuma under attack as a destroyer stands by

Next to launch from Midway were six SBDs and six SB2Us from VMSB-241, lead by Capt. Marshall Tyler. The Marines soon spotted a heavy oil slick and followed it all the way to the Japanese cruisers. The SBDs elected to attack the Mogami, but all of their bombs missed due to the cruiser’s heavy anti-aircraft fire. The SB2Us, having been delayed after sighting and investigating a submarine, arrived a few minutes later and selected the Mikuma as their target. Again anti-aircraft fire was intense and the leading Vindicator, flown by Capt. Richard Fleming, was hit and ploughed into the sea. A myth has persisted the Fleming crashed his aircraft onto the Mikuma, but in fact his SB2U crashed into the sea not far from the cruiser. Shortly after the Marines departed, eight B-17s attacked the two cruisers with limited results. Mogami and Mikuma limped on.

Spruance meanwhile had to contend with several possible targets. The report of ‘two battleships’ 125 miles from Midway (actually Mogami and Mikuma) was soon followed by an accurate report of ‘two cruisers’ (Kumano and Suzuya) further to the west of Midway , but the most enticing was a report of a ‘burning carrier, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers’ to the west of Task Force 16. This was the Hiryū, still afloat and potentially a threat. Spruance decided to attack it rather than the reported ‘battleships’. This triggered a dispute within Spruance’s staff over which bombs the SBDs should carry – Capt. Miles Browning, Spruance’s chief of staff, wanted heavy 1,000lb bombs, a marginal prospect for a target 270 miles away given the SBD’s limited fuel capacity. McCluskey, Gallaher and Shumway argued against this and Spruance agreed, delaying the launch until the distance to the target had closed and substituting 500lb bombs instead. The strike was not launched until 1500.

By this time, the Hiryū had already slipped beneath the waves of her own volition, unseen by either Japanese or American eyes. The only ship in the vicinity was the destroyer Tanikaze, which had been sent back to search for survivors and if necessary deliver the coup de grace on the carrier. Whilst engaged in this task the destroyer was bombed by B-17s which mistakenly reported the little ship as a ‘cruiser’. The Enterprise strike flew out 315 miles without finding a target, but on the return leg they came across the Tanikaze. One squadron of SBDs attacked, but thanks to superb ship-handling none of the bombs hit home, and the only damage sustained by the plucky destroyer was due to near misses that killed six of her crew. One of the attacking SBDs was shot down by Tanikaze’s anti-aircraft crews. The bombers returned to their ships as darkness was falling, necessitating the switching on of each carrier’s lights to bring them in safely. Meanwhile, the two damaged cruisers and their escort continued west at 12 knots through the night.

Strike

First thing the following morning, at 0500, a search of 18 SBDs was launched from the Enterprise to cover the area to the west of Task Force 16. One of these aircraft sighted the Mikuma and consorts about 130 miles away, but the contact report was garbled in transit and was received by Spruance as a cruiser, 3 destroyers and carrier. A second SBD accurately reported the presence of the cruisers but with a different position, which suggested two different formations of enemy ships in the vicinity. The Hornet launched a strike of 28 SBDs supported by 8 F4Fs. Shortly after their departure, the erroneous report of a carrier was corrected leaving the Hornet group to concentrate on any surface warships they encountered. They came across the Mogami and Mikuma two hours after launch. The pilots identified Mikuma as a battleship – the Mogami was now slightly shorter than her sister having crushed her bow, which presumably caused the confusion. The SBDs gained good attack position and rolled in, claiming half a dozen hits. Mogami took the brunt, suffering a direct hit on her number 5 turret which caused heavy damage to the stern of the ship. Another bomb struck near her torpedo stowage area, but her damage control officer had jettisoned the volatile torpedoes the day before and damage there was minimal. Mikuma also took two hits which caused severe damage, and the Asashio took a damaging hit on her stern area. One Dauntless was shot down.

The Enterprise strike followed at 1045 – 31 SBDs, 12 F4Fs, plus 3 TBDs with orders not to attack if there was any sign of life amongst the target’s AA crews. This strike had orders not to attack the cruisers, but instead concentrate on the reported battleship contact thought to be a few miles ahead. This strike sighted Mogami and Mikuma but continued west, searching for the ‘battleship’. After a futile search, the SBDs turned back to go after the original group – by now the only Japanese ships within range. This latest attack concentrated on the Mikuma, which suffered five more hits by 1,000lb bombs, some of which caused terrible damage. The cruiser’s torpedo area was struck and several of the ‘fish’ exploded – Mikuma’s damage control team having elected not to jettison these weapons as Mogami’s had. One SBD attacked the Mogami and struck her amidships, causing more grievous damage. Arashio and Asashio both suffered a thorough strafing attack by the F4Fs.

A shattered Mikuma following at least 11 bomb hits

A second Hornet strike was launched at 1445. By this time Task Force 16 had closed the enemy to the point that pilots at altitude could see both their own carriers and the burning enemy formation simultaneously, they were so close. In this attack the Mikuma again bore the brunt, being hit by as many as six 1,000lb bombs which left the cruiser a wreck from stem to stern. Mogami suffered another hit, and the Arashio was also hit on the stern – this bomb killed several Mikuma survivors that the destroyer had picked up. Spruance, still unsure of the identity of the targets, sent two SBDs with photographers to finally make a positive identification of the ships. These planes took detailed shots of the now derelict Mikuma, which were developed the next day and positively revealed her identity as a Mogami-class cruiser. Mikuma finally succumbed to her injuries after sunset and sank.

Spruance continued to chase the Mogami until it became clear that she was entering the umbrella of Japanese bombers based on Wake. Mogami escaped to Truk, where she was patched up and sent back to Japan for extensive repairs that lasted 8 months. She was eventually converted into a hybrid cruiser-carrier, her shattered aft turrets replaced with a small flight deck capable of housing a dozen seaplanes. Task Force 16 then broke off to head to a fuelling rendezvous, and eventually, Pearl Harbor. The Battle of Midway was over.

#midway#mogami#Central Pacific#History

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